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1 . - Introduct ion : Trading Blocs and GATT
Regional free trade zones have been unexpectedly successful in
the last decade . Since 1980 the European Communi ty enlarged
signi f icant ly i ts membership and i ts scope . It now includes southern
European countr ies, and market - integrat ing features al lowing goods,
people, services and capi tal to f low freely around an area account ing
for about one fourth of wor ld economic output .
In what appears to be a strategic response, the US has been
act ivated to enter into simi lar agreements wi th i ts neighbors . The
recent trading and investment agreement wi th Canada was signed
after many decades of doubtful considerat ion, and the trend is
expanding to the rest of the Amer icas start ing wi th Mexico . The f inal
points needed for the rat i f icat ion of NAF ' rA are st i l l undecided (1) ,
even though the US-Canada-Mexico treaty is al ready signed . This
trend is observed also in other regions . The six members of the
Associat ion of South East Asian Nat ions - Singapore, Malaysia,
(*) This art icle was prepared for the Uni ted Nat ions Program of Trade Liberal iz-
at ion in the Amer icas, ECLAC, Washington (DC) .
(1) The US is current ly in the process of imposing steel tar i f fs on a number of
countr ies including Canada, which is seeking exempt ion .
N.B . : the numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibl iography at the end of the
paper .
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Thai land, Indonesia, the Phi l ippines, and Brunei - have begun this
year to bui ld thei r Asean free trade area Afta as a future
counterweight to other internat ional trading blocs, even though at
present most of thei r trade is wi th Europe, Japan and the US and not
wi th each other . The Japanese have increasingly focused thei r
economic attent ion in thei r own region, leading to more investment in
and imports from the new East Asian manufactur ing exporters . Even
the Andean Pact seems to be progressing in Lat in Amer ica after
several decades of aimless discussions, wi th Mercosur fol lowing sui t .
Whi le regional free trade agreements prosper , the negot iat ion
towards the l iberal izat ion of global trade are unsuccessful and stal l ing,
wi th the agr icul tural markets being a key negot iat ing problem . Li tt le
goodwi l l has been generated from the GATT discussions, dispel l ing
hopes for a reversal of fortunes in the near future . Whi le the nature of
the GATT negot iat ions is pol i t ical , i t is reasonable to seek explanat ions
for the si tuat ion from an economic viewpoint .
The contrast between the lackluster performance of GATT and
the success of the regional trade pacts raises disparate react ions . One
view is that the emergence of regional trade pacts is a step in the r ight
di rect ion . In this view free trade is not defunct , but rather being
organized and approached di f ferent ly . But another , qui te natural ,
react ion is to fear that "customs unions", as regional free trade pacts
are usual ly cal led, are inherent ly opposed to global free trade . Do
customs unions increase free trade wi th insiders at the cost of
divert ing trade wi th outsiders? Since the classic works of Meade [17]
and Viner [22] classi fying the issues into trade creat ion and trade
diversion, there has been l i tt le conceptual advance on this issue . But
the issue is very al ive today, and requi res our ful l attent ion .
It is the purpose of this paper to re-examine the posi t ive and
negat ive aspects of trading blocs as they relate to gains from free
trade . The paper is pr imar i ly a discussion of conceptual issues,
al though i t is based on facts and on part icular cases which are of
interest to the trade l iberal izat ion in the Amer icas .
We take a somewhat di f ferent approach to a fami l iar issue .
Rather than asking the standard quest ion of whether regional blocs
help or hinder global free trade, we ask a more detai led quest ion :
what type of customs union is l ikely to lead to a trade war between the
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blocs, and what type of customs union is, instead, l ikely to lead to
expanded global trade . In pract ical terms : what type of trade pol icies
wi thin the blocs wi l l provide economic incent ives for expanding free
trade .
We shal l compare the impact on the wor ld economy of free trade
blocs which are organized around two al ternat ive pr inciples : one is
tradi t ional comparat ive advantages, the other is economies of scale .
The aim is to determine how the patterns of trade inside the blocs
determine the trade relat ions among the blocs .
The paper has four parts . Sect ion 2 reviews the exist ing economics
of trading blocs, and uses this to explain the current si tuat ion in the EC
and NAFTA . Sect ion 3 presents a new conceptual approach to the
economics of preferent ial trade, focusing on the internal organizat ion
of the trading blocs and the economic incent ives that this generates
wi th respect to the rest of the wor ld . Sect ion 4 is a conclusion which
pul ls the arguments together for an evaluat ion of NAFTA and an
Amer ican free trade zone, and of global free trade . The last Sect ion is
an Appendix which provides a formal general equi l ibr ium model of
trading blocs wi th increasing returns to scale and proves the mathe-
mat ical resul ts which under l ie the discussion in the text .
2 . - The Economics of Trading Blocs
2 .1 Free Trade and Market Power
163
The last ten years have seen new developments in internat ional
trade, focusing on the study of economic dynamics and of market
imperfect ions leading to strategic issues in game theory and industr ial
organizat ion . But the central tenet of the theory remains the Pareto
ef f iciency of the stat ic and compet i t ive wor ld market . In compet i t ive
markets, free trade leads to Pareto ef f icient al locat ions . There is no
way to make a someone better of f wi thout making someone else
worse of f . This is a general proposi t ion which holds for several
countr ies and several markets interact ing wi th each other simul tane-
ously . Cal led the f i rst theorem of wel fare economics, the resul t that
stat ic compet i t ive markets have Pareto ef f icient equi l ibr ia seems to
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loom the larger , the more special cases of market imperfect ions are
pointed out .
In view of the ef f iciency of compet i t ive markets, the fai lure of
GATT to br ing countr ies to an agreement about a wor ld of free trade
seems, at f i rst sight , i rrat ional . It would appear that countr ies act as i f
they could, but prefer not to, achieve a Pareto ef f icient al locat ion .
Indeed, some bel ieve that the fai lure of GATT is simply a version of the
wel l -known pr isoners ' di lemma . The words "pr isoners ' di lemma" are
used to descr ibe a gener ical ly inef f icient si tuat ion, one which, wi th
appropr iate coordinat ion, can be al tered so as to increase the wel fare
of each and al l players .
Such a view would be incorrect . GATT 's problems der ive not
from i rrat ional behavior , nor from a lack of coordinat ion or
"pr isoners ' di lemma" . The reason is that whi le free trade in compet i
t ive markets leads to Pareto opt imal solut ions, free trade may not lead
to Pareto ef f icient al locat ions when the countr ies are large and have
market power . For example, large countr ies may freely choose the
quant i t ies they export in order to manipulate to thei r advantage wor ld
market pr ices, in much the same way that a monopol ist freely chooses
to supply a quant i ty that maximizes his prof i ts considermg i ts impact
on pr ices, inducing Pareto infer ior al locat ions . For free trade to be
Pareto ef f icient markets must be compet i t ive, and countr ies must
have no market power . When countr ies are suf f icient ly large to have
an impact on market pr ices, then they often have an incent ive to
impose tar i f fs on each other .
Furthermore, under classical assumpt ions, a move from tar i f fs to
free trade wi l l typical ly make some countr ies better of f but other
countr ies worse of f . It is true that i f a compet i t ive al locat ion were
reached, i t would be Pareto ef f icient . But in a wor ld wi th tar i f fs, as we
have today, under tradi t ional assumpt ions some country wi l l lose i f
free trade is adopted .
One may ask why large countr ies have protect ionist incent ives?
The reason is that i t is possible for large countr ies to improve thei r
wel fare by improving thei r terms of trade . This is of course not true in
compet i t ive markets where the traders, by def ini t ion, have no impact
on pr ices . But the theory of trade proves that under tradi t ional
assumpt ions, a large country does have an economic incent ive to
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impose tari ffs on others . This is the standard theorem on the existence
of optimal tari ffs, which is discussed in more detai l in Section 3 .5
below . A tari ff can improve the terms of trade of a large country, even
though it may distort its production and consumption . What the
theorem says is that, under tradit ional assumptions, there is always an
optimal tari ff , one at which the gains from increasing its terms of
trade through tari ffs exceeds the losses due to distortions . A textbook
analysis of a simple case is found for example in Krugman and Obsfelt
[15] . This theorem is widely accepted, understood and appl ied .
Of course, the argument in favor of optimal tari ffs is not true for
smal l countries . It is essential that the country should be large enough
to have the abi l ity to have an impact on prices . Furthermore the larger
the country, the more market power it has, and the more it can gain
from imposing tari ffs on others . The impl ication of this is that i f a
world of smal l competitive economies merges into a few trading blocs,
then under tradit ional assumptions, after the blocs are formed, there
are more incentives for imposing tari ffs than before . In other words,
regional free trade associations, under tradit ional condit ions, lead to
protectionism .
The optimal tari ff which we have just discussed is imposed by one
country on others uni lateral ly . The theorem does not consider the
possibi l ity of retal iation by other countries . But what if they retal iate?
What if other countries also impose tari ffs in response?
We now move to a world of strategic considerations, a world with
tari ff wars . Each county imposes tari ffs on each other, and does so stra-
tegical ly so as to maximize its wel fare given the actions of others . The
outcome of this tari ff game was studied in Kerman and Riezman [12] ,
[13] . I f each country chooses as its tari ff the best response to the
others ' , a market equi l ibrium with tari ffs is reached . We cal l this an op-
t imal tari ff equi l ibrium to distinguish it from the free trade equi l ibrium .
In an optimal tari ff equi l ibrium some countries are better off than
they would be at a free trade equi l ibrium, Kennan and Riezman [12] ,
[ 13] and Riezman [21 ] . In other words, not al l countries would benef it i f
the world were to move from the optimal tari ff equi l ibrium into a world
with free trade . Furthermore, these works show that the larger the
country, the more it can improve its wel fare at the optimal tari ff equi l ib-
r ium from the level that it could achieve at a free trade equi l ibrium .
166
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To a certain extent the current situation in the world economy
can be described as an optimal tari ff equi l ibrium . Each country
imposes tari ffs on others strategical ly . In this l ight the di ff icult ies of
GATT have a reasonable explanation . The unwi l l ingness of countries
to agree to mult i lateral free trade is neither irrational nor a coordi -
nation problem . It is a rational response to economic incentives of
countries with market power .
One immediate impl ication is that, under tradit ional condit ions,
regional trade blocs which increase the market power of the market
participants wi l l natural ly lead to tari ff wars . The larger the market
power of a trade bloc, the greater is its incentive to impose tari ffs on
others . Even after retal iatory moves are taken into account the same
proposit ion holds : the larger the market power of the bloc, the greater
is its possible gain from a tari ff war . Therefore i f the formation of
regional trade blocs increases the market power of the participants,
the creation of regional free trade zones encourages trade wars .
We have remarked that the results on optimal tari ffs and on the
optimal tari ffs equi l ibria hold under tradit ional assumptions . Since
each of these results predicts that regional free trade zones create
incentives against global free trade, it becomes crucial to examine the
role of these tradit ional assumptions closely . For whenever these
condit ions are satisf ied, regional free trade inevitably leads to trade
wars . And the larger the free trade zones, the more l ikely it is that they
wi l l lead to trade wars .
We shal l examine these condit ions in some detai l in the next
section . This examination wi l l be conceptual , . but focused on par-
ticular cases of immediate interest . Drawing on the classical results on
tari ffs of Lerner [16] and of Metzler [19] , and on new results on
trading blocs with economies of scale Chichi lnisky [9] reported also in
the Appendix, we shal l show that i f the blocs are organized internal ly
around the principle of economies of scale, the optimal tari ff theorem
is defeated . This means that, under increasing returns condit ions, it is
not true that a country is better off by the uni lateral imposit ion of a
posit ive tari ff on its imports . But before we turn to the new results, we
shal l explore the impl ications of the optimal tari ff theorem on the
European Community and on NAFTA .
We shal l argue that trade patterns can be based on tradit ional
\ (s Gz. ~ A && _. OFrA
co.
ex
de
fre
Pa
fr(
re
ei i
st
m
zc
w
re
cl
e :
ei
vi
K
c:
el
p
sl
n
n
2
2 .2 EC and NAFTA
Tradi t ional Comparat ive Advantages vs . etc.
comparat ive advantages or on economies of scale . It is to a large
extent a matter of pol icy choice . The trade pol icies wi thin a trade bloc
determine the extent to which the trade bloc wi l l aid or hinder global
free trade . The argument for this resul t , and i ts impl icat ions for trade
pol icy, wi l l occupy the rest of this paper.
We now turn to the possible mot ivat ion for the US in forming a
free trade zone wi th i ts neighbors .
The argument uses simple strategic considerat ions based on the
resul ts discussed in the previous sect ion . NAFTA - and any further
extension to a larger free trade zone in the Amer icas, can be seen as a
strategic response by the US to the creat ion of the European Com-
muni ty trading bloc . The European Communi ty bloc is a free trade
zone wi th a quarter of wor ld output . In seeking to form a trading bloc
wi th i ts natural trading partners in the Amer icas, the US appears to
respond to the creat ion of more market power , wi th an attempt to
create more market power . This is a rat ional response i f the US
expects a uni ted Europe to impose tar i f fs on the rest of the wor ld . The
emergence of a region wi th increased market power general ly pro-
vides an incent ive to other regions to seek simi lar status .
More explanatory power st i l l can be extracted from the resul ts of
Kennan and Riezman [ 12] , [13] and Riezman [21 ] on who wins trade
wars . Fol lowing the creat ion of a customs union, the incent ives are to
create or join another free trade zone, but not at random . The
economic incent ive is to join another free trade zone wi th the largest
possible market power . This resul t al lows us to predict that the US
should not only seek a free trade deal wi th Canada, but one wi th as
many countr ies in the Amer icas as possible . The aim is to reach
market power which exceeds that of a uni f ied Europe .
2 .3 Trade Creat ion and Diversion
167
Once a new free trade zone is created, how do we measure the
gains and losses from trade?
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A naive view is that since free trade in compet i t ive markets is
Pareto ef f icient , any move towards free trade is posi t ive . As we saw,
this would not be correct . We argued that regional trade blocs, being
larger than thei r components, wi l l have more market power and
therefore an incent ive to impose tar i f fs against outsiders under tradi -
t ional condi t ions . Therefore one of the f i rst negat ive ef fects of the
format ion of a trading bloc is that i t can hurt the countr ies outside
these areas . We shal l argue below that these negat ive ef fects can be
mi t igated i f the trading patterns wi thin the blocs are organized around
economies of scale .
But are the damages of free trade zones l imi ted to protect ionism
wi th the rest of the wor ld? The answer to this quest ion is general ly no .
There is a second potent ial damage in the format ion of regional trade
blocs . Even i f the trading blocs are not accompanied by protect ionism
against the rest of the wor ld, they can st i l l lead to trade diversions .
This means that a regional free trade bloc may lead to the wrong
special izat ion wi thin the bloc . The classical argument about trade
diversion is found in Viner [22] , whose work remains a benchmark of
analysis of preferent ial trade agreements . We shal l summar ize his
argument here in order to show that , i f trading wi thin the blocs is
organized around economies of scale, then Viner 's argument can
break down . Wi th economies of scale, the negat ive ef fect of trade
diversion can be mi t igated . The empi r ical evidence discussed below
suggests that this is what has happened in the European Market since
1958 .
The essent ial argument can be captured from the textbook
Table 1 :
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There are three countr ies, Germany, Portugal and the USA . They
trade a commodi ty, vegetable oi l . Ini t ial ly Germany has a tar i f f that
appl ies equal ly to al l imported oi l . I f i t imports oi l despi te the tar i f f , i t
wi l l buy ini t ial ly from the USA, which of fers the best pr ice . This
appears in the second column, showing a low ini t ial tar i f f . I f the tar i f f
is high enough, however , then Germany wi l l produce i ts own oi l , as in
column 3 . Now i f Germany enters into a free trade agreement wi th
Portugal , what are the wel fare impl icat ions? I f the tar i f f was ini t ial ly
the higher , the wel fare of Germany increases after the regional bloc is
created, since i t replaces i ts domest ic oi l wi th a less expensive oi l and
uses i ts domest ic resources in more product ive sectors . However , i f
the tar i f f was ini t ial ly as in column 3, after the free trade agreement
Germany shi fts from Amer ican to Portuguese oi l , i .e. from a low cost
to a higher cost producer . In this case, the free trade zone lowers
wel fare .
Viner 's point is that there are "trade creat ing" free trade zones, in
which the increase in imports by members from one another replaces
domest ic product ion . These are desi rable . However , free trade blocs
could also be "trade divert ing" in the case that imports are diverted
from a lower cost source outside the bloc to other sources inside the
bloc which are less product ive, but wi th more attract ive pr ices after
the tar i f fs were select ively dropped .
The extra trade among the members of the trading bloc is,
general ly, an improvement of wel fare . The trade which is not
addi t ional , but a diversion from ef f icient outside sources to less
ef f icient inside sources lowers wel fare . I f northern Europe is induced
by the entry of southern Europe to buy oi l from Portugal rather than
an equivalent from the US, and the US source is more ef f icient but less
compet i t ive after the tar i f fs are dropped in Europe, there has been a
wel fare loss . General ly speaking Viner 's approach evaluates free trade
zones by the extent to which more trade is created, rather than
exist ing trade diverted from one source to another .
Viner 's or iginal insight remains central to the analysis of prefer -
ent iai free trade zones . But , in pract ice, i t misses an important aspect .
The increase size of the market can somet imes lead to more ef f iciencv
and compet i t iveness . Even in the cases where Viner 's analysis predicts
wel fare losses, namely when the trade bloc diverts trade from outside
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sources to less compet i t ive inside sources, wel fare can st i l l increase
wi th economies of scale . This can be explained simply in our numer i -
cal example . As Portugal expands i ts oi l product ion due to i ts new
trade to Germany, i t becomes more ef f icient . This appears in Table 2,
column 2 . After the tar i f fs were removed Portugal produces and
exports more oi l and i t becomes more compet i t ive, reaching the US
level .
TRADE IS NOT DIVERTED WITH ECONOMIES OF SCALE
TABLE 2
Economies of scale can therefore have a major impact on trade
pol icies . We showed that they can check the negat ive trade diversion
ef fects of a trading bloc . We shal l argue in what fol lows that they can
also l imi t another major negat ive ef fect of a trading bloc : the incent -
ives for large blocs wi th market power to impose tar i f fs on others .
What does the empi r ical evidence show? It is widely bel ieved that
economies of scale were an important factor in the success of the
Treaty of Rome. Economies of scale were central to the success of the
European Common Market which was formed in 1958 . Whi le a
strong possibi l i ty for trade diversion existed a pr ior i in the EC, in
real i ty huge inter - industry trade emerged in manufactures . The in-
crease in market size and the associated rat ional izat ion in product ion
led to ef f iciency gains which took precedence over possible trade
diversion . Krugman [14] discusses this issue in some detai l , wi thout
however of fer ing a conceptual relat ion between economies of scale
and the economics of trading blocs . ( (Hopes for large benef i ts from
both the US-Canada free trade agreement and Europe 1992 rest
largely c
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largely on an increase in competition and rational ization . In the North
American case, the estimate of Harris and Cox, who attempt to take
account of competitive / industrial organization effects, suggest a gain
for Canada from free trade that is about 4 times larger than those of
standard models . In Europe the widely cited and somewhat con-
troversial f igure of 7 percent gain due to 1992 presented in the
Cechini Report Commission of the European Communit ies 1988 rests
primari ly on estimates by Al isdair Smith and Anthony Venables of
gains from increased competition and rational ization» .
In practice, therefore, economies of scale can defeat trade
diversion losses, and transform these into gains . I shal l also argue
below that they can also defeat the incentives for tari ff wars between
blocs, so that the formation of trading blocs can become a paral lel ,
complementary effort towards the l iberal ization of world trade .
3 . - Trading Blocs with Economies of Scale
3 .1 Trade Inside and Between the Blocs
Although predictions are inherently dangerous in an area so
circumscribed by pol it ical action, our conclusion is that regional free
trade can have di fferent effects on global markets and it should be to a
certain extent the choice of wel l informed and reasonable economic
agents which one wi l l prevai l .
Regional trading blocs based on tradit ional comparative advan-
tages wi l l general ly divert trade . They wi l l also typical ly hinder the
prospects of global negotiations . In this case, as the bloc has more
market power than its parts, it has the incentive to impose larger
tari ffs on the rest of the world . Regional blocs then develop incentives
for imposing tari ffs against each other, and for engaging in trade
wars . This type of regional free trade zone works against global free
trade .
There is, however, an alternative . I f the regional trade zones are
oriented to the expansion of trade based not on tradit ional compara-
tive advantages but rather on increased size and on the productive
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ef f iciency and compet i t iveness that comes wi th economies of scale,
matters could be qui te di f ferent . In this latter case, the regional free
trade zones could unleash an appet i te for further expansion of trade .
We shal l argue that in this case the incent ive for blocs to impose tar i f fs
against each other is reduced, and in fact can be defeated by the
economic incent ives in favor of trade expansion which accompanies
economies of scale . The incent ives are now for further expansion of
trade . The creat ion of trading blocs which are organized around
economies of scale is therefore part of a broader trend towards
increasingly open wor ld markets .
3 .2 The Amer icas : Tradi t ional Comparat ive Advantages
or Economies of Scale
A central issue in our argument is the pattern of trade inside the
blocs . This issue is of part icular importance in an Amer ican free trade
zone . This is because of al l the regions, the Amer ican area is the one
whose trade is current ly based on tradi t ional comparat ive advantages
and on the diversi ty between the traders ' economic development
rather than on economies of scale .
The matter is not onlv one of economic real i tv : i t is also one of
perceived economic real i ty . Both the European and the East Asian
countr ies perceive gains from trade as a matter of exploi t ing econ
omies of scale . The newly industr ial ized countr ies in Asia, and the
Japanese, have a dynamic vision of comparat ive advantages . Moving
up the ladder of comparat ive advantages in the product ion and trade
of ski l led- labor manufactures, of consumer electronics, and of pro-
ducts based on special ized knowledge and on technological ski l l , are
widespread pr ior i t ies .
By contrast , wi thin the sphere of inf luence of the US, the vision of
trade based on tradi t ional comparat ive advantages st i l l prevai ls . It
permeates to a great extent the thinking about internat ional trade at
the government level , at the internat ional organizat ion level , at the
academic, and even at the journal ist level .
The European free trade zone is, to a certain extent , a zone of
equals . To encourage this equal i ty, the introduct ion of free mobi l i ty of
Tradit ional Comparative Advantages vs . etc.
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labor has been one of the f irst steps in the European market integr-
ation of 1992 .
The Americas, on the other hand, have the US as a hegemon, a
"hub" which concentrates on exporting manufactures and ski l l - intens-
ive goods to the "spokes" in exchange for their resources . The free
mobi l ity of labor between the hub and the spokes is an unspoken
issue . It has not even been contemplated in the American negotiations
for free trade . It has not been mentioned by any of the governments
concerned that labor could move freely between the free trade
partners, as it does in the EC region . In some cases, quite to the
contrary, the free trade agreement has been mentioned as a way to
l imit the mobi l ity of labor between the concerned countries, such as
Mexico and the US .
To the extent that labor remains a f ixed input of production
within the countries of the American free trade zone, tradit ional
comparative advantages based on labor wi l l be invoked as a founda
tion for pol icy . The concern is that an American free trade zone, i f it
emerges, may ref lect the historical patterns of trade between indus-
trial and developing regions, which is usual ly cal led North-South
trade .
3 .3 Tradit ional Comparative Advantages
and the Global Environment
Another reason for concern with respect to tradit ional compara-
tive advantages arises from the current focus on the environment .
Tradit ional comparative advantages emphasize the South 's concentra
tion in the production and export of goods which deplete environ-
mental resources, such as wood pulp and cash crops which overuse
rain forests, or minerals whose combustion leads to the emission of
greenhouse gases . Recent work in the area of North-South trade with
environmental inputs to production (Chichi lnisky [7] , [8]) shows that
i l l -def ined patterns of property rights on forests, f isheries, and arable
land in developing countries may lead to a market- induced over-sup-
ply of goods which are intensive in the use of these resources as
inputs, and to Pareto ineff icient patterns of international trade . What
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appears as comparative advantages may simply be a ref lection of a
market fai lure in the developing countries . Social and private com-
parative advantages di ffer and social and private gains from trade may
also di ffer in these circumstances . Tradit ional tax pol icies, levying
duties on the use of such inputs in the South, may not work, and may
indeed lead to more extraction of the resource and more exports of
the resource- intensive commodity . Indeed, it is shown in Chichi lnisky
[7] , [8] that di fferences in property rights on inputs of production are
suff icient to explain the patterns of trade between nations . The global
environment is therefore another reason for being concerned with
tradit ional comparative advantages as a foundation for trade . Since
two thirds of the current exports from Latin America are resources,
and the main trade of Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico with the US is
petroleum, this problem is very real . It is also very real with respect to
the trading in wood products which lead to the deforestation of the
remaining tropical forests, Amelung [1] , Barbier et Al . [2] , Binkley -
Vincent [3] , Hyde - Neumann [ 11 ] . Replacing tradit ional comparative
advantages with economies of scale could be a necessary feature of a
program of sustainable development .
3 .4 Ski l led Labor and External Economies of Scale
It seems desirable at this point to distinguish an mnortant
di fference between two types of economies of scale-
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product ion funct ion faces increasing cost per uni t of output , i .e .
decreasing returns to scale, which assures compet i t ive behavior .
However , as the industry as a whole expands, external i t ies are created
which lead to increased product ivi ty for al l the f i rms . A good example
is provided by the electronics industry . Each computer manufacturer
faces a rather compet i t ive market . On the other hand, as the overal l
level of output of the industry expands, knowledge about new tech-
nologies develops and this new knowledge, which is easi ly and rapidly
di f fused across the industry, leads to lower costs for al l . Just about any
industry which depends heavi ly on knowledge has this character ist ic .
In real i ty, the factor which leads to increasing returns is the ski l l of the
labor force which embodies knowledge . Knowledge is typical ly
di f fused and can be captured and imi tated sooner or later , and there
are abundant examples in the software and hardware industry to
prove this point (2) . Knowledge creates ski l led labor , and this in turn
leads to increasing returns to scale, which usual ly, al though not
always, are external to the f i rm . Because of this ski l led labor can
simul taneously lead to economies of scale, and to compet i t ive
markets . The successful development exper ience of Korea, of Taiwan,
and more recent ly of the Asian Tigers, showns that export - led pol icies
based on ski l led labor intensive goods, for example in consumer
electronics, is general ly more successful than those intensive in the
use of inexpensive and uneducated labor . This point was developed
formal ly in Chichi lnisky [4] , [6] , and more recent ly in terms of
development pol icies in Dadzie [10] .
In this paper we shal l concentrate on external economies of scale,
which are closely connected wi th product ion systems based on ski l led
labor .
3 .5 Opt imal Tar i f fs : Tradi t ional Theory
We ment ioned above that a large country wi l l typical ly impose
tar i f fs so as to improve i ts terms of trade . In doing so i t typical ly
(2) Microsoft 's Windows excel lent imi tat ion of the Apple operat ing systems was
tested in the US courts and found wi thout faul t.
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introduces distort ions in i ts product ion and consumpt ion . Here we
shal l show in a simple example how under tradi t ional assumpt ions
there is a tar i f f that improves wel fare, in the sense that the gains from
improved terms of trade exceed the losses from distort ions . The
analysis is completely standard, see e .g. Krugman and Obsfel t [15] ,
but i t is included here in order to highl ight the di f ferences which ar ise
in economies wi th increasing returns to scale . This is discussed in the
next sect ion .
The analysis in this sect ion rel ies on one assumpt ion and one
simpl i f icat ion . Both are raised in the Appendix, which consider the
general case . The assumpt ion here is that the supply and demand
curves of the economy are l inear and exhibi t decreasing returns to
scale, and that there are no major income ef fects . The simpl i f icat ion is
to neglect the impact of the tar i f f revenues on income ; this is typical ly
done in textbooks, and wi l l also be done in this sect ion . It is however
expl ici t ly analyzed in the Appendix .
We assume that the home country H has a demand curve wi th
equat ion :
D= a- by
where p is the domest ic pr ice of the good and a supply curve :
Q=e+fP
Country H ' s demand for imports is the di f ference :
D-Q=(a-e) - (b+f )p
Foreign export supply is also a straight l ine :
(Q*-D*)=g+hpu,
where p , is the wor ld pr ice . The internal pr ice in country H exceeds
the wor ld pr ice by the tar i f f :
P = PW+ t
Solving equation (6) for t = 0 gives pf , the world price that would
prevai l without tari ffs . Then a tari ff t alters the internal price to :
p= pf + th / (b+ f+ h)
and the world price to :
p ,= pf - t(b+f) / (b+ f+ h)
Note that i f the parameters a, e, b, h and f are al l posit ive, then :
implying that the tari ff raises the internal price P and lowers the world
price p , .
It is immediate to show that, under these condit ions, it is always
possible to f ind a tari ff t that increases the country 's wel fare . Let q,
and d, be the free trade levels of consumption and production . Since
the internal price is higher after the tari ff , domestic supply rises from
q, to q2 and demand fal ls from d, to d2 :
(10)
and :
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In a world equi l ibrium imports must equal exports :
(a-e) - (b+ f)x(pw+t)=q+hp  ,
pf < P
 
and p.+> > pf
q2 =q,+tfIt / (b+f+h)
d2 =d, -tbh / (b+f+h)
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The gain in wel fare from a lower world price is the area of the
rectangle in Graph 1, the fal l in the price mult ipl ied by the level of
imports after the tari ff :
(12) gain in wel fare = (d2 - q2) x t (b+ f) / (b+ f+ h) =
t x (di - 4i ) x (b+f) l (b+f+h) - (t)2 x h(b+f)2 / (b+f+h)2
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GAINS AND LOSSES FROM TARIFFS :
TRADITIONAL CASE
The net ef fect on wel fare is therefore :
gain - loss = t x U - (t)2 x V
GRAPH i
9
The loss from distorted consumpt ion is the sum of the areas of
the two tr iangles in Graph 3 :
loss in wel fare = (1 /2) x (q2 - q, ) x (P - pf ) +
+ (1 /2) x (d, -d2 ) x (P-pf )=(t)2x (b+f ) x h2/2 (b+f+h) ` '
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where U and V are constants . The net effect is the sum of a posit ive
number times the tari ff rate and a negative number times the square
of the tari ff rate . It fol lows that when the tari ff is suff iciently smal l the
net effect must be posit ive, since tZ is smal ler than t, for t near zero .
This establ ishes that, when supply and demand, income effects of the
tari ff income are neglected and are l inear and tari ffs are smal l , there
exists a posit ive tari ff which increases the wel fare of the country
beyond that which can be obtained under free trade .
The size of the country matters . I f the importing country is smal l ,
then foreign supply is highly elastic i .e . h is very large, so from (8) we
veri fv that the tari ff has l ittle or no effect on world prices pw whi le
raising domestic prices P almost one-to-one .
3 .6 Optimal Tari ffs with Economies of Scale
The argument in the previous section shows that a large country
is better off by imposing tari ffs than it is under free trade . This
proposit ion holds under tradit ional condit ions, one of which is that
the supply of goods should increase with prices across market equi l ib-
r ia . In our example, this is formal ized by the parameters in the supply
function in equation (2) , which is upward sloping . However, this
assumption ceases to be val id when the economy has economies of
scale . In such economies the larger the output the lower the costs,
and therefore, in principle, the lower the prices . The, i f , 0 in
equation (8) , which in turn can lead to a negative wel fare gay trom
the tari ff from equation (12) .
.A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the electro-
nics industry, for example computer hardware . The last f i fteen years
have seen a dramatic decrease in prices together with a dramatic
expansion of output of computer hardware . This occurs because the
expansion in output leads to rational ization and the corresponding
increased eff iciency in production . In the hardware industry this takes
the form of technological change which improves productive eff ici -
encv and lowers the costs of the industry as a whole . Even though a
technological breakthrough may in principle be patented, and there-
fore could be captured by one f irm with the corresponding increase in
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i ts market power and deviat ion from compet i t ive behavior , in pract ice
the computer industry is very compet i t ive . This is because the know-
ledge which dr ives the technological innovat ion in this industry is
easi ly di f fused .
A standard textbook analysis of such economies of scale is for
example Nicholson [20] , pages 252-5, who documents that most
studies of long- run cost curves have found that average costs are
decreasing up to a point and then constant . Examples provided are
agr icul ture, electr ici ty generat ion, rai l roads, and commercial banking,
al l act ivi t ies which are broadly associated wi th economic develop-
ment . The same textbook analysis explains how compet i t ive markets
can lead to a negat ive associat ion of quant i t ies and pr ices across
equi l ibr ia . This was the content of the famous debate in the 1920 's
between J .H . Clapham, A .C . Pigou and D .H . Roberston, which was
resolved posi t ively, and which appeared in the Economic Journal
between 1922 and 1924 (3) . Chichi lnisky and Heal [5] have discussed
in some detai l the pol icy impl icat ions of internat ional trade in econ-
omies wi th increasing returns to scale in a report on trade pol icies in
the 1980 's to the Secretary General of UNCTAD, and they reach
simi lar conclusions .
We shal l now show how the analysis of opt imal tar i f fs in the last
sect ion breaks down when there are increasing returns to scale . In
such economies there may be no gains from imposing tar i f fs, even i f
the country is large and has substant ial market power. The opt imal
tar i f f theorem no longer holds . We shal l now explain how this
happens in a concrete case .
It is useful to remind ourselves how tar i f fs increase wel fare in the
economy of the previous sect ion . Tar i f fs increase wel fare by lower ing
the wor ld pr ices p, : this was seen in equat ion (7) . The country 's terms
of trade thus improve after the tar i f f . It imports fewer lower cost
goods from the rest of the wor ld . The wel fare gains were computed in
equat ion (12) : these depend crucial ly on the fact that , after the tar i f f ,
the consumers pay lower pr ices for the goods they import .
However , this argument no longer holds wi th economies of scale .
Wi th economies of scale the wor ld pr ice may increase rather than
(3) See NICHOISON [20] , p . 332 .
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decrease after the tari ff . The wel fare gains from tari ffs are the drop in
world prices times the quantity imported . But i f the world price
increases, the gains are transformed into losses .
The possibi l ity that after a tari ff the terms of trade deteriorate for
the country was studied in Lerner [16] and Metzler [19] . They argue
mostly in terms of income effects . A simi lar phenomenon occurs in
our economy, but due to di fferent causes . In contrast with the
economy of the previous section, the parameter f in equation (8) is
now negative rather than posit ive ; this means that across equi l ibria
the prices drop as quantities increase, or otherwise said, prices
increase when quantities drop . I f the tari ff decreases the quantity
produced and traded, this wi l l lower the productive eff iciency of the
economy . Costs increase and therefore prices increase too . The tari ff
defeats the gains from rational ization in production produced by the
larger market size . This is represented in Graph 2 . It shows a negative
correlation between market clearing prices and the quantity of goods
sold at an equi l ibrium, and how this leads to an increase in the world
prices after the tari ff , corresponding to a decrease in output .
We saw that after the tari ff , the world price p.+, can be higher
rather than lower as it is in the tradit ional case with decreasing
returns to scale . The terms of trade for the country are therefore
worse after the tari ff . Consumers in the country are worse off : the
price of their imports have increased . Al l of this is formal ly ref lected in
the systems of equations presented above . In equation (7) the para-
meter f describing the relation between supply and prices, which was
previously posit ive, is now negative . In practical terms the fol lowing
condit ions are suff icient for the world price to increase rather than
decrease after the tari ff :
b< 1fI < h
f<0,b,h>0
Condit ions (15) are satisf ied under a variety of circumstances . For
example (15) holds when foreign export supply increases with, and is
highly responsive to, prices (h > 0 and large) , a resonable assumption
for the world, when the country has increasing returns to scale (f < 0)
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and the quantity produced is more responsive to price than is the
demand (b > 0, b <
 
I f I ) .
The main condit ion is the existence of economies of scale in the
economy (f < 0) . Under these condit ions, the optimal tari ff theorem is
no longer true, as the countries may have no economic incentive to
impose tari ffs on others : they lose by restricting trade .
Consumer electronics, semiconductors, software production,
banking and f inancial services, and just about any sector whose
productivity depends mostly on knowledge and information have
these characteristics . Software production is today actively developed
in India as an export business . It is a sector which is simultaneously
labor intensive and subject to informational economies of scale . As
already discussed, the remarkable economic development of the
Asian Tigers over the last f i fteen years prof ited from the expansion of
their international trade of ski l led- labor intensive products such as
consumer electronics . This sector is simultaneously labor intensive
and subject to informational economies of scale .
Al l the arguments just presented hold equal ly for countries or for
trading blocs . To the extent that sectors with economies of scale
expand within the free trade zone, the zone itsel f loses its economic
incentives to use its market power to restrict trade and wage tari ff
wars against others .
We have argued that the formation of trading blocs typical ly
harms the global l iberal ization of markets when the blocs are them-
selves organized under the principle of tradit ional comparative advan
tages . Under these condit ions, the larger the market power of the bloc
the greater its incentives to impose tari ffs on others . Protectionism
emerges from the increased market power of the traders .
Relation can lead to a tari ff war between the blocs . Furthermore
under tradit ional assumptions, the larger country wins the tari ff ware .
Therefore the larger the trading bloc, the more l ikely it is to impose
tari ffs and to win a trade war .
Trading blocs of this nature have no economic incentive to favor
18 4 Graciela Chichi lnisky
the GATT negot iat ions . They are better of f wi th tar i f fs than wi th free
trade . Indeed, the economic incent ives of such trading blocs are
contrary to the GATT 's intent ions . We argued that , to a certain extent ,
this explains the f lounder ing of the GATT negot iat ions .
We discussed the example of the EC bloc in contrast wi th NAFTA
or wi th an eventual Amer ican free trade zone . The empi r ical evidence
suggests that the EC trading bloc benef i ted from increasing returns to
scale .
NAFTA, and any eventual Amer ica free trading bloc, emerged as
a strategic response to the increased market power of the European
trading bloc . By contrast wi th the EC trading bloc, the emerging
NAFTA appears to be organizing under the tradi t ional theory of
comparat ive advantage .
The lack of any provision for the mobi l i ty of labor between the
countr ies of the region reinforces this trend . NAFTA does not contem-
plate the mobi l i ty of labor between Mexico and the US . The lack of
labor mobi l i ty tends to lock- in the tradi t ional comparat ive advantages
between the countr ies wi thin the area . Thei r trading on the basis of
comparat ive advantages wi thin bloc wi l l create incent ives for trade
wars between the blocs .
A di f ferent scenar io contemplates a NAFTA organized around
economies of scale . Example for such scenar ios include the Indian
software trade, and the Asian Tigers ' special izat ion in consumer
electronics . Typical ly, electronic-based industr ies have increasing
returns der ived from the creat ion and di f fusion of knowledge as
output expands . This leads to rat ional izat ion in product ion and to
increased ef f iciency and thus lower costs . The expansion of output is
accompanied by lower rather than higher pr ices . From the point of
% - iew of the exporter , these markets are less l ikely to be protected
because the importer , having increasing returns to scale in this
industry, has less incent ives to rely on tar i f fs than i t does in other
industr ies wi th decreasing returns . Wi th increasing returns, tar i f fs
decrease trade and can increase wor ld pr ices, thus decreasing the
%vel fare of the import ing country . Economies of scale produce incent -
i~- es to expand trade .
We formal ized this issue by showing that economies of scale can
defeat the standard resul t of opt imal tar i f fs . Whi le under tradi t ional
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condit ions, a trading bloc is always better off with tari ffs than it is with
free trade, we showed that with increasing returns to scale this is no
longer true . Tari ffs decrease the size of the market, and therefore
decrease productive eff iciency in economies with increasing returns .
This decrease in eff iciencv leads to increased rather than lower world
prices, and the main purpose of the tari ff , which is to improve the
countries ' terms of trade, is defeated . Under these condit ions trading
blocs are better off with free trade, and with the corresponding
expanded markets, than they are with tari ffs . To the extent that
NAFTA organizes itsel f around economies of scale in the international
trade within the region, the incentives for a trade war between NAFTA
and the EC are mit igated .
It seems useful to remind ourselves that the choice of products
and of technology are to a large extent the subject of pol icy . They
need in no way interfere with market eff iciency . The f irst wel fare
theorem about the eff iciency of competitive markets appl ies to a
market with given technologies and with given products . The theorem
does not explain how di fferent technologies or products arise : i t
proves that once technologies and products are given, competitive
markets lead to Pareto eff iciency . Once the product mix and the
technologies are chosen the market can operate eff iciently . This
impl ies that the organizing principles within the blocs - tradit ional
comparative advantages or economies of scale - are, to a great
extent, a matter of pol icy choice . Choosing di fferent trade pol icies, for
example, choosing technologies and the product mix, can be achieved
without market distortions or loss of market eff iciency . This point was
already made by Meade [18] several years ago .
The emergence of an American trading bloc which reinforces the
current tendency towards the exploitation of tradit ional comparative
advantages is a source of concern . It has been argued Chichi lnisky
[4] , [5] , [6] that export- led pol icies based on (unski l led) labor inten-
sive products can defeat the goals of development and trade by
depressing the country 's terms of trade and overal l consumption .
Trade between the countries of the Americas is organized today
around tradit ional comparative advantages : labor and resource inten-
sive exports from the South and capital and ski l l - intensive exports
from the North . I f the emergence of an America free trade zone is
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based on simi lar pr inciples, then not only may this cont inue a
depressing growth trend in Lat in Amer ica, but in addi t ion i t could
create or reinforce incent ives against the global l iberal izat ion of free
trade .
We have argued that another reason to avoid trade pol icies
between the countr ies of the Amer icas based on tradi t ional compara-
t ive advantages is that they tend to deplete envi ronmental assets such
as forests, f isher ies or fert i le land, and overuse minerals which are
exported by the developing countr ies to the North. Some of these
minerals are the source of potent ial ly dangerous C02 emissions .
Petroleum exported from Mexico, Ecuador and Venezuela to the USA
f i ts this descr ipt ion . Indeed, any concept of sustainable development
requi res a rethinking of trade pol icies away from those based on
comparat ive advantages . This general premise is part icular ly wel l
sui ted to the NAFTA, and to the Amer icas as a whole, since two thi rds
of Lat in Amer ican exports today are resources .
The main point of this paper is that the character ist ics of trading
pol icies wi thin the trading blocs can determine the extent to which the
blocs wi l l favor or harm the global negot iat ions towards free trade .
Trading pol icies based on comparat ive advantages are general ly nega-
t ive towards GATT . We argued that trading pol icies based on econ-
omies of scale could have the posi t ive ef fect towards global free trade :
they could mi t igate the economic incent ive of tar i f fs and trade
restr ict ion in favor of an expansion of wor ld trade . The emergence of
such blocs could advance in tandem wi th the global l iberal izat ion of
wor ld trade .
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APPENDIX
This appendix develops an internat ional trade model and proves
formal ly the proposi t ions on customs unions stated in the body of the
paper .
The model presented here extends the North-South model intro-
duced in Chichi lnisky [4] , [5] , [6] , to the case of economies which
trade goods produced under condi t ions of increasing returns to scale,
and proves formal ly the proposi t ion that wi th increasing returns to
scale, large countr ies can achieve higher wel fare levels wi th free trade
than wi th tar i f fs . This model consider Cobb-Douglas product ion func-
t ions, and i t assumes that there exist economies of scale in product ion
which are external to the f i rm, such as in the example of the
electronic industry discussed in the text .
The model descr ibes two countr ies, 1 and Z, producing and
trading two goods B (basic goods) and I ( industr ial goods) wi th each
other; these goods are produced using two inputs, labor L and capi tal ,
K The economies of the two countr ies are compet i t ive, so that in
each country pr ices are taken as given by consumers and producers .
Producers maximize prof i ts, and consumers maximize ut i l i ty subject
of thei r budget constraints . Wal ras ' law is sat isf ied, so that the value
of the excess demand is equal to zero . At an equi l ibr ium al l markets,
for goods and for factors, clear .
The increasing returns to scale considered here are "external" to
the f i rm as in the example of parts of the electronics industry
discussed in the text . This means that in the product ion funct ions,
formal ized below, there exists a parameter denoted y which increases
wi th the level of output of the economy . As the outputs of the
economy expand, the product ion funct ion var ies, formal izing the
not ion that factors are more product ive at higher levels of aggregate
output. However , the f i rm takes this parameter y as given - this is
the assumpt ion that the increasing returns are external to the f i rm .
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For each given value of the parameter y the f irm has constant returns
to scale . The f irms are therefore competitive, and in particular zero
prof its are achieved at an equi l ibrium .
Consider the model of one country f irst . The production functions
are :
(16)
where a, R, E (0, 1) , y is a posit ive parameter, L l and K, are the inputs
of labor and capital in the B sector, and L2 and KZ the inputs of labor
and capital in the I sector. The total amount of labor and capital in the
economy are LS and Ks respectively . Prices are PB and pi ; we assume
that
 
I is the numeraire so that :
(17)
(18)
(19)
Graciela Chichi lnisky
BS =yL1 'Ki_z
P = y M K2' - '
PI = 1
Factor prices are denoted as usual : w for wages and r for rental
on capital . We shal l assume for simpl icity that the demand for basic
goods at an equi l ibrium is known :
Bd = Bd
so that by Walras ' law the demand for industrial goods in equi l ibrium
is given by :
Id = (wLs + r KS - PB Bd)
because of zero prof its . More general demand functions than those
postulated in (18) can be given without a major effect on the results,
see for example the various forms of demand functions uti l ized in
Chichi lnisky [6] . Indicating the equi l ibrium level of exports by XB
and the equi l ibrium level of imports by k ' ,*, the model of the world
economy is formal ized by the fol lowing equi l ibrium condit ions :
(20)
2 . - Solving the Model
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pB Bs* + 1* = w* L* + rK*
(zero prof its)
K*=K S =K,+K2
(capital market clears)
L*=LS =L,+L2
( labor market clears)
Bs* = Bd* + XS*
(B market clears)
Id* = IS* + X;*
(I market clears)
The model for the world economy consists of two countries,
indicated with the indices 1 and 2, each speci f ied as above . To solve
the model , there are therefore f ive prices to be determined : the "terms
of trade" PB, and two factor prices in each country : iv and r. The
quantities to be determined in an equi l ibrium are : the use of factors in
each sector of each country : KI , K2 , LI , 12 , the outputs of the two
goods BS and IS , and the corresponding parameter -f determinin g the
external economies of scale, the exports and imports of each of the
two goods in each of the two countries, XB and X;*, and the demand
for each good in each country : Bd* Id* . There is a total of twenty seven
variables to be determined endogenously, including al l prices and
quantities in al l markets and both countries .
In the fol lowing proposit ion 1 we shal l prove that al l of these
variables can be determined once the variable giving the terms of
trade in equi l ibrium pB is known . Furthermore we shal l prove that
there exists one "resolving equation" which determines the equi l ib-
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r ium value of the terms of trade as a funct ion of al l the exogenous
parameters of the model , of which there are six in each country : a, R,
6, Bd*, L s and K s , and a total of twelve in the wor ld economy .
3 . - The Ef fects of a Tar i f f on the Terms of Trade
Proposi t ion 1 : i f the import ing country 1 has external economies
of scale ;
y = y(B) = BQ , a> 1
and the foreign supply is highly elast ic (a XB / a PB) > 0 and very
large then no tar i f f can increase the wel fare of the country relat ive to
that which the country can achieve under . free trade .
Proof : consider a wor ld economy wi th two countr ies def ined as in
equat ions (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) . We shal l now solve the model by
f inding an expl ici t expression for the equi l ibr ium terms of trade PB* in
the wor ld economy . This consists of wr i t ing the market clear ing
condi t ions in the B market , exports equal imports, and expressing i t
as a funct ion of one var iable : PB. From the terms of trade in
equi l ibr ium, we show that al l other endogenous var iables can be
found . We shal l use the indices 1 and 2 to dist inguish the parameters
of the two countr ies . Note f i rst that we have given no speci f icat ion of
demand or supply behavior outside of an equi l ibr ium ; in part icular ,
there is no informat ion for carrying out stabi l i ty analysis . Since the
model has constant returns to scale, prof i t maximising supply func-
t ions are, as is standard, undef ined . As is standard in models wi th
constant returns to scale, we der ive the equi l ibr ium relat ions between
suppl ies and pr ices from the condi t ion of ful l employment of factors
together wi th an equi l ibr ium condi t ion which incorporates the extern-
al economies of scale .
Denote :
1,=L, /K,
12=L2 /K2
Since by assumption each f irm takes the parameter Y as given,
from the production functions (16) , marginal condit ions and zero
prof its imply :
(21)
so that :
(22)
and in particular :
(23)
(24)
so that :
(25 ,
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w=Ya(L 1 /K l ) ' - 1 PB =Ya17
r = Y (1 - a) 1T PB
w = Y R1~ -
'
r = Y(1
1 Pa
w
=
r (1
_
a
 
I
La)J
1 1 and
w
=
r (1
-
R)J
12
IL a
1 1 = [(1 -
R)
a] 12
fa(1 - a)]
Our next step is to def ine an equation (cal led the "resolving
equation" and denoted F = 0) which yield the equi l ibrium value of the
terms of trade PB as a function of al l the exogenous parameters of the
model of which there are 12 as l isted above, and from which al l other
endogenous variables at equi l ibrium are expl icit ly computed .
Indicating logarithms with the symbol """ the four equations in
(21) can be rewritten as :
iv=(a - 1)11+a+pB+Y
r=od 1 +( l -oc)+pB+~%
w=(R - 1)12+R+r
r=P12+(1-R)+,r
(a- 1)11 +x+15B = ( R - 1)12+
al l +(1-cc)+pB=(312+(1-R)
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or equivalently :
(26)
and :
(28)
where :
(0 - 1)11+(1=0)12=R - PB - oc
011-R12 PB - (1-«)
Solving for 1 1 , 12 we obtain :
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P) - (
 
0) L(1=R) - PB - (1-001
(27) 11 =
LR - «1
- L(«C-1)L(1=0) -PB- (1-a)] -L(VPB-a)a11
From (27) and (28) we obtain :
1 1 = PB +A
(R - 00
(a - 00
A= L(R-x)(
- 0) - (1-R)L (1=a) - (1-0011
B=
(p - 00
[Oc - IM , = 0) - (1 - x 01 -
0)
A > 0 and B < 0 i f 0 < a
0(R - 0)
(30)
and :
(31)
or :
or :
(34)
and :
'35)
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Therefore :
Now :
12
= ea PB, , cP
- z)
s _
12-
(LS L, )
>Ls-L,=12 (Ks-K1)
Ks - K,
L, = Ls- 12 WS - K1)
and :
(32)
 
11 = L, /K, > L, 1 1 K,
so that :
Ls- 12 ("Ss - K1)=11 K,
(33) K1 (1 1 - I 2 ) = Ls-12 Ks > K, = (Ls - I2 KS) / (11 -12 )
From (31) (32) (33) we obtain :
K,
- (LS - 12 KS)
(11 - 12)
L 1 = ( 11) (Ls - 12 KS)
(11 - 12)
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from which together with (30) we obtain the levels of supply of labor
and capital used in each sector, at an equi l ibrium as a function of the
equi l ibrium level of the relative price of B:
Li =
 
Ls
- Ks PB / (a-a)
(e`; - eB) (eA - eB)
Ls
A _ eB
Pa '"- P _ eB (eA _ eB) ICS
From (16) (36) we obtain the quantity of B and I produced at each
level of relative prices, PB . Now taking y = 1, we denote these as 0
(PB ) and * (PB ) respectively . Therefore from (16) we obtain the
equi l ibrium level of outputs as a function of equi l ibrium prices :
B ' = Y(~ (PB)
Is = Y* (PB)
Note that this does not ful ly express output as an expl icit function
of equi l ibrium prices because ^r = y (B) . In order to obtain outputs as
expl icit functions of equi l ibrium prices we must also f ind out the
equi l ibrium value of y = y * (B) , which is "f ixed point" problem, since
- ! depends on B and B depends on Y . We solve this as fol lows .
The economy has increasing returns which are external to the
f irm, and the parameter 7 increases with the level of output of B and
1 :
y = Ba
At an equi l ibrium equations (38) and (39) must be
simultaneously, i .e . :
Y = LY ' 0 (PBT
a
- YQ 0 (PB) Q or Y ' - '7 = 0 (PB) Q
satisf ied
so th
7
betty ,
(41)
so th
since
3 .
t ion
(42)
or :
vari ;
for i
fron
ma
of t .
(43)
so
that
:
(41)
(42)
or :
(43)
Note
that
:
Tradit ional
Comparative Advantages vs
.
etc
.
Y
= (~ (PB)Ql (1-a)
Therefore
at an equi l ibrium from (38) we obtain
between
the outputs of B and I , and PB
:
BS
 
(PB)Q+
/ ( ' - Q)
IS
=
(PB)°+
1 / ( ' a)
when
ce >1, 0 = a + 1 /1 - 6 < 0
a
so
when BS = (~ (PB)a+ ' / ( ' - °) d creases with PB a ross equi l ibria,
since
~ (PB) is an increasing func on of PB for each f ixed 1 ' , see Graph
3 .
I f
a- -+1, 0
-ao .
To
solve the mod l we now c sider the mark clearing condi -
t ion
in B
.
At world equi l i i , the B m ket must clear so that
:
Bd '1
(PB + t) - BS ' ' (PB + ) = s,2 (PB) - Bd,2 (PB)
F
, t) = d, ' (PB + t) - B5, ' (PB t) - Bs,2 (PB) + Bd
.2
(PB) = 0
From
(18) (19) (21) (30) and 41 , qu tion (42) is a function of the
variable
lon , which we cal l a reduced form "resolvi g" equa on
for
this m d
.
Solving this eq atio g v he equi l r ium v l es of PB
from
wher al l other v r bles an be comput d as hown b ve
.
T
model
i u solv
.
We
may no study th changes in he e ms of tr de as a functi
of
the tari ff t
.
Bv t e impl i it fu c i n the r m
:
-
a F /at
apBlat
=
a
Fl PB
-
(a (Bd" - "I PB + t)
Bd ' '%
(PB + t) + Bd
.2i
P - a s, / 0 (PB + 0 - a B`211 9 PB
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EACH FIRM FACES AN UPWARD COST CURVE .
THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE FACES A DOWNWARD COST CURVE
DUE TO EXTERNAL ECONOMIES OF SCALE
GRAPH 3
"w B
By the assumptions on demand for B, i f 6 i > 1, then a B ' , ' ,1 '9 (pB
+ t) < 0 and therefore the numerator of (43) is negative . The
denominator is also negative, so that a pB / a t >
 
0 . As the tari ff t
increases, PB also increases . The terms of trade of the country
decrease, since it imports B and must now pay more for it, as we
wished to prove .
;RAPH 3
RVE
' a(PB
The
I_r i f f t
untn ,
Is we
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